Chronic economic public sector

L es malfunctions of some public enterprises, the need to preserve public finances of their consequences and the necessary adjustment to the competitive environment persuaded the government that major reorganizations were necessary for the public economic sector.

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Also, he launched and the Parliament for its part, a general reflection, the first by asking a working group report on the State shareholder, which has already reached a result in the form of creation an 'Agency of public interests ", the second by creating a committee of inquiry on public enterprises. But, in addition, various decisions have been taken or are being studied for clean some businesses either to clean up their financial situation (France Telecom) or to draw the consequences of difficult to repair situations (GIAT), or to prevent damage (Bank of France).

I - THE REPORT OF WORKING GROUP BARBER OF GREENHOUSE

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The Minister of Economy, Finance, and Industry requested, on 6 November 2002, a report on "The State shareholder and governance of SOEs' a working group chaired by Mr. Barbier de la Serre , former president of Capital markets Board and former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission  [1] [1]  This group also included Messrs. David Jacques, President ... .

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Two observations should be made at the outset on the very subject of the report. As was the Nora report of 1967, long considered the benchmark for the management of public sector enterprises, it is as a new general policy report in this area. Moreover, retaining the theme of "state ownership", the Minister of Economy, Finance, and Industry has set the mission, on the one hand, a wider field of inquiry than that of public enterprises, since it includes minority state holdings and, secondly, an independent field of the variety of their legal status and their characteristics regarding their missions or their specific business rules.

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The mission statement was based on the observation that "the state does not exercise its ownership function satisfactorily" for various reasons "confusion of roles filled by the State in respect of companies, both regulator strategist, shareholder ',' insufficient identification "of the latter role," the lack of clear guidance to officers "," poorly functioning board, "an often excessive presence of the state in daily management of the company. "

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The report, dated 24 February 2003, is divided into three parts: the State and public enterprises, state ownership, the government-owned enterprises. The first part of the report seeks to identify principles to govern the State's relations with public companies, while the two following sections provide an important set of proposals. It, therefore, seems a good way to summarize it by following the text and quoting extensively before formulating some comments on his contributions as well as the issues raised by the concepts which it uses and their implementation conditions.

A) The principles and proposals of the report

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In the first part - "the state and public enterprises" - the report calls ( the contentpoint I) to "distinguish between state functions and to organize the exercise," which implies a "clarification required" basis on two principles. The first is to "clearly distinguish the role of shareholder of the state of other functions it fulfills in respect of companies in which it holds a stake" strategist, customer, responsible for public services, "the blur and widespread use of the word "supervision" illustrates well the current role confusion and ambiguity of the objectives assigned to companies. The second principle is to note that "the procedures for exercising the State of his other functions have no reason to exist substantially different depending on whether or not present at the company's capital. These functions are expressed either through the channel of general laws and regulations, either by contractual see. "

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He deduces a third principle that must be "a generalized approach" public service concession "on the part of the State with regard to companies to which they delegate a public service activity," In any shareholder or not even if one shareholder or if the company is in a monopoly position. He added that "the negotiated contracts and must ensure both transparency of public service content and conditions of its support, and the economic efficiency of the service. Being placed specifically in the line of the 1967 Nora report, the report contains some points that should define these "public service contthe content

of public service or universal service

specifications that the operator must comply,

financial counterparties of these public service obligations, whether in the form of tariff increases granted to subsidization, grants or extending the duration of the concession.

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It specifies the duration (three to five years) of these contracts would be negotiated between the company, the relevant functional departments, and management of the budget that would "guarantee of its effectiveness and would provide financial compensation if the balance of the contract the requires ".

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A fourth principle recalls the need to "ensure the regular competitiveness of the operator, for competition or collection of comparative data when there are an operator and strict compliance with their contractual commitments by the parties. The fifth indicates to "isolate public service activities in competitive activities to avoid cash transfers and ensure the fair competition" and "subject to the principle of opening the capital of an undertaking each once it significantly expands activities in the competitive sphere. "